A BSDE approach to Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals  by Lin, Qian
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Stochastic Processes and their Applications 122 (2012) 357–385
www.elsevier.com/locate/spa
A BSDE approach to Nash equilibrium payoffs
for stochastic differential games with nonlinear
cost functionals
Qian Lin∗
School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
Laboratoire de Mathe´matiques, CNRS UMR 6205, Universite´ de Bretagne Occidentale, 6, avenue Victor Le Gorgeu, CS
93837, 29238 Brest cedex 3, France
Received 24 January 2011; received in revised form 28 July 2011; accepted 23 August 2011
Available online 31 August 2011
Abstract
In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential
games via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a
characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential
games with nonlinear cost functionals defined with the help of doubly controlled backward stochastic
differential equations. Our results extend former ones by Buckdahn et al. (2004) [3] and are based on a
backward stochastic differential equation approach.
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1. Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Isaacs [11], differential games and stochastic differential games
have been investigated by many authors. Fleming and Souganidis [7] were the first to study zero-
sum stochastic differential games and obtained that the lower and the upper value functions of
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such games satisfy the dynamic programming principle and coincide under the Isaacs condition.
Recently, based on the ideas of Fleming and Souganidis [7], Buckdahn et al. [3] studied Nash
equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games, while Buckdahn
and Li [4] generalized at one hand the results of Fleming and Souganidis [7] for stochastic
differential games and simplified the approach considerably by using backward stochastic
differential equations. We refer the reader to Fleming and Souganidis [7] and Friedman [8] for
a description of earlier results. In the present paper, we bring ideas of the both papers [3,4]
together, in order to study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games with nonlinear cost functionals.
As concerns deterministic differential games, since the work of Kononenko [13] in the
framework of positional strategies and Tolwinski et al. [19] in the framework of Friedman
strategies, it is well known that deterministic nonzero-sum differential games admit Nash
equilibrium payoffs. Recently, Buckdahn et al. [3] generalized the above result to two-player
nonzero-sum stochastic differential games and obtained an existence and a characterization for
two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. On the other hand, since the works of
Case [5] and Friedman [8], Nash equilibrium payoffs should be the solution of Hamilton–Jacobi
equations. Based on these ideas, Bensoussan and Frehse [1] and Mannucci [15] generalized the
above result to stochastic differential games using the existence of smooth enough solutions for
a system of parabolic partial differential equations, while Hamade`ne et al. [10], Hamade`ne [9]
and Lepeltier et al. [14] used a saddle point argument in the framework of backward stochastic
differential equations. But both methods rely heavily on the assumption of the non degeneracy
of diffusion coefficients.
In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games. The generalization of the earlier result by Buckdahn et al. [3] concerns
the following aspects. First, our cost functionals are defined by controlled backward stochastic
differential equations, and the admissible control processes depend on events occurring before
the beginning of the stochastic differential game. Thus, our cost functionals are not necessarily
deterministic. Second, since our cost functionals are nonlinear, we cannot apply the methods used
in [3]. We make use of the notion of stochastic backward semigroups introduced by Peng [17],
and the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. Finally, each player has his own
backward stochastic differential equation, controlled also by the adversary player, which defines
his own cost functional.
Beyond the theoretical interest of this paper, the result of the paper is also applicable in
finance and economics. For instance, we can consider an application of our theoretical result
to a problem arising in financial markets. Let the financial market consist of a risk-free asset and
risky stocks and consider two investors (players) in this financial market. Both investors try to
maximize their payoff functionals, which are, in general, different. To maximize them, they have
to use investment strategies with delays. Indeed, although both investors react immediately to the
financial market, the financial market is not so quick in reacting to the moves of both investors.
The above described problem leads to a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game.
We can use our theoretical result to get an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of
Nash equilibrium payoffs for this game.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notations and preliminaries
concerning backward stochastic differential equations, which we will need in what follows. In
Section 3, we give the main results of this paper and their proofs, i.e., an existence theorem and
a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games as well as their proofs.
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2. Preliminaries
Let (Ω ,F ,P) be the classical Wiener space, i.e., for the given terminal time T > 0, we
consider Ω = C0([0, T ];Rd) as the space of continuous functions h : [0, T ] → Rd such that
h(0) = 0, endowed with the supremum norm, and let P be the Wiener measure on the Borel
σ -field B(Ω) over Ω , with respect to which the coordinate process Bt (ω) = ωt , ω ∈ Ω , t ∈
[0, T ], is a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion. We denote by NP the collection of all
P-null sets in Ω and define the filtration F = {Ft }t∈[0,T ], which is generated by the coordinate
process B and completed by all P-null sets:
Ft = σ {Bs, s ≤ t} ∨NP, t ∈ [0, T ],
where NP is the set of all P-null sets.
Let us introduce the following spaces, which will be needed in what follows.
• L2(Ω ,FT ,P;Rn) =

ξ | ξ : Ω → Rn is an FT -measurable random variable
such that E[|ξ |2] < +∞

,
•H2(0, T ;Rd) =

ϕ | ϕ : Ω × [0, T ] → Rd is an {Ft }-adapted process such that
E
∫ T
0
|ϕt |2dt < +∞

,
• S2(0, T ;R) =

ϕ | ϕ : Ω × [0, T ] → R is an {Ft }-adapted continuous process
such that E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|ϕt |2] < +∞

.
We consider the BSDE with data ( f, ξ):
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
f (s, Ys, Zs)ds −
∫ T
t
ZsdBs, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (2.1)
Here f : Ω × [0, T ] × R × Rd → R is such that, for any (y, z) ∈ R × Rd , f (·, y, z) is
progressively measurable. We make the following assumptions:
(H1) (Lipschitz condition): There exists a positive constant L such that for all (t, yi , zi ) ∈
[0, T ] × R× Rd , i = 1, 2,
| f (t, y1, z1)− f (t, y2, z2)| ≤ L(|y1 − y2| + |z1 − z2|).
(H2) f (·, 0, 0) ∈ H2(0, T ;R).
The following existence and uniqueness theorem was established by Pardoux and Peng [16].
Lemma 2.1. Let the assumptions (H1) and (H2) hold. Then, for all ξ ∈ L2(Ω ,FT ,P;R),
BSDE (2.1) has a unique solution
(Y, Z) ∈ S2(0, T ;R)×H2(0, T ;Rd).
We recall the well-known comparison theorem for solutions of BSDEs, which has been
established by El Karoui et al. [6] and Peng [17].
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Lemma 2.2. Let ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω ,FT ,P;R), and f 1 and f 2 satisfy (H1) and (H2). We denote
by (Y 1, Z1) and (Y 2, Z2) the solutions of BSDEs with data ( f 1, ξ1) and ( f 2, ξ2), respectively,
and we suppose that
(i) ξ1 ≤ ξ2,P-a.s.,
(ii) f 1(t, Y 2t , Z
2
t ) ≤ f 2(t, Y 2t , Z2t ), dtdP-a.e.
Then, we have Y 1t ≤ Y 2t , a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, if P(ξ1 < ξ2) > 0, then
P(Y 1t < Y 2t ) > 0, t ∈ [0, T ], and in particular, Y 10 < Y 20 .
By virtue of the notations introduced in the above lemma, for some f : Ω×[0, T ]×R×Rd →
R, we put
f 1(s, y, z) = f (s, y, z)+ ϕ1(s), f 2(s, y, z) = f (s, y, z)+ ϕ2(s).
Then we have the following lemma. For the proof the readers can refer to El Karoui et al. [6],
and Peng [17].
Lemma 2.3. Suppose that ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω ,FT ,P), f satisfies (H1) and (H2) and ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈
H2(0, T ;R). We denote by (Y 1, Z1) and (Y 2, Z2) the solution of BSDEs (2.1) with data ( f 1, ξ1)
and ( f 2, ξ2), respectively. Then we have the following estimate:
|Y 1t − Y 2t |2 +
1
2
E
∫ T
t
eβ(t−s)[|Y 1s − Y 2s |2 + |Z1s − Z2s |2]ds | Ft

≤ E

eβ(T−t)|ξ1 − ξ2|2 | Ft

+ E
∫ T
t
eβ(t−s)|ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)|2ds | Ft

,
where β = 16(1+ L2) and L is the Lipschitz constant in (H1).
3. Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games
The objective of this section is to investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player
nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals. An existence theorem
(Theorem 3.20) and a characterization theorem (Theorem 3.16) of Nash equilibrium payoffs for
two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games are the main results of this section.
Let U and V be two compact metric spaces. Here U is considered as the control state space
of the first player, and V as that of the second one. The associated sets of admissible controls
will be denoted by U and V , respectively. The set U is formed by all U -valued F-progressively
measurable processes, and V is the set of all V -valued F-progressively measurable processes.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , we consider the following control
system
dX t,ζ ;u,vs = b(s, X t,ζ ;u,vs , us, vs)ds + σ(s, X t,ζ ;u,vs , us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],
X t,ζ ;u,vt = ζ,
(3.1)
where t ∈ [0, T ] is regarded as the initial time, and ζ ∈ L2(Ω ,Ft ,P;Rn) as the initial state. The
mappings
b : [0, T ] × Rn ×U × V → Rn,
σ : [0, T ] × Rn ×U × V → Rn×d
are supposed to satisfy the following conditions:
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(H3.1) For all x ∈ Rn, b(·, x, ·, ·) and σ(·, x, ·, ·) are continuous in (t, u, v).
(H3.2) There exists a positive constant L such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ′ ∈ Rn, u ∈ U, v ∈ V ,
|b(t, x, u, v)− b(t, x ′, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v)− σ(t, x ′, u, v)| ≤ L|x − x ′|.
It is obvious that, under the above conditions, for any u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , the control system
(3.1) has a unique strong solution {X t,ζ ;u,vs , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T }, and we also have the following
estimates.
Lemma 3.1. For all p ≥ 2, there exists a positive constant C p such that, for all t ∈
[0, T ], ζ, ζ ′ ∈ L2(Ω ,Ft ,P;Rn), u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V ,
E

sup
t≤s≤T
|X t,ζ ;u,vs |p|Ft

≤ C p(1+ |ζ |p), P-a.s.,
E

sup
t≤s≤T
|X t,ζ ;u,vs − X t,ζ
′;u,v
s |p|Ft

≤ C p|ζ − ζ ′|p, P-a.s.
Here the constant C p only depends on p, the Lipschitz constant and the linear growth of b
and σ .
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , we consider the following BSDE:
Y t,ζ ;u,vs = Φ(X t,ζ ;u,vT )+
∫ T
s
f (r, X t,ζ ;u,vr , Y t,ζ ;u,vr , Z t,ζ ;u,vr , ur , vr )dr
−
∫ T
s
Z t,ζ ;u,vr dBr , t ≤ s ≤ T, (3.2)
where X t,ζ ;u,v is introduced in Eq. (3.1) and
Φ = Φ(x) : Rn → R,
f = f (t, x, y, z, u, v) : [0, T ] × Rn × R× Rd ×U × V → R
satisfy the following conditions:
(H3.3) For all (x, y, z) ∈ Rn × R× Rd , f (·, x, y, z, ·, ·) is continuous in (t, u, v).
(H3.4) There exists a positive constant L such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x ′ ∈ Rn , y, y′ ∈
R, z, z′ ∈ Rd , u ∈ U and v ∈ V ,
| f (t, x, y, z, u, v)− f (t, x ′, y′, z′, u, v)| + |Φ(x)− Φ(x ′)|
≤ L(|x − x ′| + |y − y′| + |z − z′|).
It is by now standard that under the above assumptions Eq. (3.2) admits a unique solution
(Y t,ζ ;u,v, Z t,ζ ;u,v) ∈ S2(0, T ;R) × H2(0, T ;Rd). Moreover, in [4] it was shown that the
following holds:
Proposition 3.2. There exists a positive constant C such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], u(·) ∈ U and
v(·) ∈ V , ζ, ζ ′ ∈ L2(Ω ,Ft ,P;Rn),
|Y t,ζ ;u,vt | ≤ C(1+ |ζ |), P-a.s.,
|Y t,ζ ;u,vt − Y t,ζ
′;u,v
t | ≤ C |ζ − ζ ′|, P-a.s.
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We now introduce subspaces of admissible controls and give the definition of admissible
strategies.
Definition 3.3. The space Ut,T (resp. Vt,T ) of admissible controls for Player I (resp., II) on the
interval [t, T ] is defined as the space of all processes {ur }r∈[t,T ] (resp., {vr }r∈[t,T ]), which are
F-progressively measurable and take values in U (resp., V ).
Definition 3.4. A nonanticipating strategy with delay (NAD strategy) for Player I is a measurable
mapping α : Vt,T → Ut,T , which satisfies the following properties:
(1) α is a nonanticipative strategy, i.e., for every F-stopping time τ : Ω → [t, T ], and for
v1, v2 ∈ Vt,T with v1 = v2 on [[t, τ ]], it holds α(v1) = α(v2) on [[t, τ ]]. (Recall that
[[t, τ ]] = {(s, ω) ∈ [t, T ] × Ω , t ≤ s ≤ τ(ω)}.)
(2) α is a nonanticipative strategy with delay, i.e., for all v ∈ Vt,T , there exists an increasing
sequence of stopping times {Sn(v)}n≥1 with
(i) t = S0(v) ≤ S1(v) ≤ · · · ≤ Sn(v) ≤ · · · ≤ T ,
(ii) Sn(v) < Sn+1(v) on {Sn(v) < T }, n ≥ 0,
(iii) P(

n≥1{Sn(v) = T }) = 1,
such that, for all n ≥ 1,Λ ∈ Ft and v, v′ ∈ Vt,T , we have: if v = v′ on [[t, Sn−1(v)]](Λ×
[t, T ]), then
(iv) Sl(v) = Sl(v′), on Λ,P-a.s., 1 ≤ l ≤ n,
(v) α(v) = α(v′), on [[t, Sn(v)]](Λ× [t, T ]).
The set of all NAD strategies for Player I for games over the time interval [t, T ] is denoted
by At,T . The set of all NAD strategies β : Ut,T → Vt,T for Player II for games over the time
interval [t, T ] is defined symmetrically and denoted by Bt,T .
We have the following lemma, which is useful in what follows.
Lemma 3.5. Let α ∈ At,T and β ∈ Bt,T . Then there exists a unique couple of admissible control
processes (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that
α(v) = u, β(u) = v.
Such a result can be found already in [3]. However, since our definition of NAD strategies differs,
we shall provide its proof.
For given control processes u(·) ∈ Ut,T and v(·) ∈ Vt,T , we introduce now the associated cost
functional
J (t, x; u, v) := Y t,x;u,vs |s=t , (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn .
(Recall that Y t,x;u,v is defined by BSDE (3.2) with ζ = x ∈ Rn .) We define the lower and the
upper value functions W and U , resp., of the game: for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn , we put
W (t, x) := esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J (t, x;α, β),
and
U (t, x) := essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
J (t, x;α, β).
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Here we use Lemma 3.5 to identify (X t,x;α,β , Y t,x;α,β , Z t,x;α,β) = (X t,x;u,v, Y t,x;u,v, Z t,x;u,v),
and, in particular, J (t, x;α, β) = J (t, x; u, v), where (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T is the couple of
controls associated with (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T by the relation (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v).
Remark 3.6. For the convenience of the reader we recall the notion of the essential infimum and
the essential supremum of families of random variables (see, e.g., [12] for more details). Given
a family of F-measurable real valued random variables ξα (α ∈ I ), an F-measurable random
variable ξ is said to be essinf
α∈I ξα , if
(i) ξ ≤ ξα,P-a.s., for all α ∈ I ;
(ii) if for any random variable η such that η ≤ ξα,P-a.s., for all α ∈ I , it holds that η ≤ ξ,P-a.s.
We introduce the notion of esssup
α∈I
ξα by the following relation:
esssup
α∈I
ξα = − essinf
α∈I (−ξα).
Remark 3.7. Lemma 3.5 guarantees that for NAD strategies α ∈ At,T and β ∈ Bt,T there
exists a unique associated couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T of admissible controls such that
α(v) = u, β(u) = v. For general nonanticipative strategies we can, in general, not get such
a couple of controls. Let us give an example: we suppose that U = V and ϕ,ψ : U → U are
measurable functions such that ψ ◦ ϕ does not have a fixed point. We define
α(v)s = ϕ(vs), s ∈ [t, T ], v ∈ Vt,T ,
β(u)s = ψ(us), s ∈ [t, T ], u ∈ Ut,T .
Then α and β are nonanticipative strategies for Player I and II, respectively. But there is no
couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that α(v) = u, β(u) = v. Indeed, if there existed such couple
of controls (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , we would have, for s ∈ [t, T ],
us = α(v)s = ϕ(vs),
vs = β(u)s = ψ(us) = ψ ◦ ϕ(vs).
But this means that vs is a fixed point of ψ ◦ϕ, which contradicts the assumptions of the absence
of fixed points.
Let us now give the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Proof. We give the proof in two steps.
Step 1: For (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T we denote by {Sn(v)}n≥1 (resp., {Tn(u)}n≥1) the sequence of
stopping times associated with α ∈ At,T (resp., β ∈ Bt,T ) by Definition 3.4. Then, for arbitrarily
given (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T we define the optional set
Γ :=

n≥1

[Sn(v)] ∪ [Tn(u)]

,
where [Sn(v)] (resp., [Tn(u)]) denotes the graph of Sn(v) (resp., Tn(u)). Then, for ω ∈ Ω , we
have
Γ (ω) =

Sn(v)(ω), Tl(u)(ω), n, l ≥ 1, s.t. Sn(v)(ω) < T, Tl(u)(ω) < T

T

,
and we observe that Γ (ω) is a finite set.
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We denote by DΓ the first hitting time of Γ , and we define a sequence of {Fr }-stopping times
as follows:
τ0 = t,
τ1(u, v) = DΓ (=S1(v) ∧ T1(u)),
τ2(u, v) = DΓ\[τ1(u,v)] ∧ T,
...
τn(u, v) = DΓ\∪n−1i=1 [τi (u,v)] ∧ T, n ≥ 1.
Recall that a ∧ b = min{a, b}, a, b ∈ R.
We notice that τ1(u, v) is independent of (u, v), and for n ≥ 2, τn(u, v) depends only on
(u, v)|[[t,τn−1(u,v)]]. Indeed, this is a direct consequence of point (2) in Definition 3.4 and the
definition of {τn(u, v)}n≥1.
From the definition of {τn}n≥1 it follows that, for all (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
(i) t = τ0 ≤ τ1(u, v) ≤ · · · ≤ τn(u, v) ≤ · · · ≤ T ,
(ii) τn(u, v) < τn+1(u, v), on {τn(u, v) < T }, n ≥ 0. Moreover, since Γ (ω) is a finite set,
P(dω)-a.s.,P(

n≥1{τn(u, v) = T }) = 1.
(iii) For n ≥ 1 and all (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , it holds: if (u, v) = (u′, v′) on
[[t, τn−1(u, v)]], then τl(u, v) = τl(u′, v′), 1 ≤ l ≤ n, and α(v) = α(v′) and β(u) = β(u′),
on [[t, τn(u, v)]].
Step 2: For α ∈ At,T and β ∈ Bt,T , we let {τn}n≥1 be constructed as above. Since neither τ1
depends on the controls nor (α, β) restricted to [[t, τ1]] does, the process
(u0, v0) := (α(v0), β(u0)), for arbitrary (u0, v0) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
is such that α(v0) = u0 and β(u0) = v0, on [[t, τ1]].
Taking into account that τ2 only depends on the controls restricted to [[t, τ1]], and
(α(v0), β(u0))|[[t,τ2(u0,v0)]] only depends on the controls (u0, v0) restricted to [[t, τ1]], we can
define
(u1, v1) := (α(v0), β(u0)),
and since we have (u1, v1) = (u0, v0) on [[t, τ1]], it follows that (u1, v1) = (α(v1), β(u1)), on
[[t, τ2(u1, v1)]]. Repeating the above argument we put
(un, vn) := (α(vn−1), β(un−1)) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T .
Then, since due to (n − 1)th iteration step (α(vn−1), β(un−1)) = (un−1, vn−1), on
[[t, τn(un−1, vn−1)]], we also have (un−1, vn−1) = (un, vn), on [[t, τn(un−1, vn−1)]], and, thus,
also τl(un, vn) = τl(un−1, vn−1), 0 ≤ l ≤ n + 1. Hence,
τn(u
n−1, vn−1) = τn(un, vn) ≤ τn+1(un, vn) = τn+1(un+1, vn+1), n ≥ 1,
from which we deduce the existence of the limit of stopping times
τ := lim
n→∞ τn(u
n, vn) ≤ T .
For arbitrarily given (u0, v0) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T we define
(u, v) :=
−
n≥0
(un, vn)1[[τn−1(un−1,vn−1),τn(un ,vn)[[ + (u0, v0)1[[τ,T ]].
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Obviously, (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , and since (u, v) = (un, vn) on [[t, τn(un, vn)]], we have
τl(u, v) = τl(un, vn), 0 ≤ l ≤ n + 1, n ≥ 0 (see the above property (iii)). But this allows
to conclude from (ii) that
P

n≥1
{τn(un, vn) = T }

= P

n≥1
{τn(u, v) = T }

= 1.
Consequently, since the above defined process (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T has the property that
(α(v), β(u)) = (α(vn), β(un)) on [[t, τn(u, v)]] (nonanticipativity of (α, β))
= (un, vn) = (u, v) on [[t, τn(u, v)]],
we have (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v) on [t, T ] × Ω , dsdP-a.e. The proof is complete. 
The following lemmas were established in [2] under a slightly different definition of NAD
strategies. However, their validity in our new framework can be checked easily.
Lemma 3.8. Under assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.4), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn , the value functions
W (t, x) and U (t, x) are deterministic functions.
Lemma 3.9. There exists a positive constant C such that, for all t, t ′ ∈ [0, T ] and x, x ′ ∈ Rn ,
we have
(i) W (t, x) is 12 -Ho¨lder continuous in t:
|W (t, x)− W (t ′, x)| ≤ C(1+ |x |)|t − t ′| 12 ;
(ii) |W (t, x)− W (t, x ′)| ≤ C |x − x ′|.
The same properties hold true for the function U.
Remark 3.10. From the above lemma it follows, in particular, that the functions W and U are
of at most linear growth, i.e., there exists a positive constant C such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
x ∈ Rn , |W (t, x)| ≤ C(1+ |x |).
We now recall the notion of stochastic backward semigroups, which was introduced by
Peng [17] and translated by Buckdahn and Li [4] into the framework of stochastic differential
games. For a given initial condition (t, x), a positive number δ ≤ T − t , for admissible
control processes u(·) ∈ Ut,t+δ and v(·) ∈ Vt,t+δ , and a real-valued random variable η ∈
L2(Ω ,Ft+δ,P;R), we define
G t,x;u,vt,t+δ [η] := Y t,x;u,vt ,
where (Y
t,x;u,v
s , Z
t,x;u,v
s )t≤s≤t+δ is the unique solution of the following BSDE with time horizon
t + δ:
Y
t,x;u,v
s = η +
∫ t+δ
s
f (r, X t,x;u,vr , Y
t,x;u,v
r , Z
t,x;u,v
r , ur , vr )dr
−
∫ t+δ
s
Z
t,x;u,v
r dBr , t ≤ s ≤ t + δ,
and X t,x;u,v is the unique solution of Eq. (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ Rn .
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We observe that for the solution Y t,x;u,v of BSDE (3.2) with ζ = x ∈ Rn we have
J (t, x; u, v) = Y t,x;u,vt = G t,x;u,vt,T [Φ(X t,x;u,vT )] = G t,x;u,vt,t+δ [Y t,x;u,vt+δ ]
= G t,x;u,vt,t+δ [J (t + δ, X t,x;u,vt+δ ; u, v)].
Remark 3.11. For the special case that f is independent of (y, z) we have
G t,x;u,vs,T [Φ(X t,x;u,vT )] = G t,x;u,vs,t+δ [Y t,x;u,vt+δ ]
= E
[
Y t,x;u,vt+δ +
∫ t+δ
s
f (r, X t,x;u,vr , ur , vr )dr | Fs
]
, s ∈ [t, t + δ].
In particular,
G t,x;u,vt,T [Φ(X t,x;u,vT )] = E
[
Φ(X t,x;u,vT )+
∫ T
t
f (r, X t,x;u,vr , ur , vr )dr | Ft
]
.
For more details on stochastic backward semigroups, the reader is referred to Peng [17] and
Buckdahn and Li [4]. Let us also recall the following dynamic programming principle for the
value functions of stochastic differential games. Its proof can be found in [2].
Proposition 3.12. Under assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.4) the following dynamic programming
principle holds: for all 0 < δ ≤ T − t, x ∈ Rn ,
W (t, x) = esssup
α∈At,t+δ
essinf
β∈Bt,t+δ
G t,x;α,βt,t+δ [W (t + δ, X t,x;α,βt+δ )],
and
U (t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt,t+δ
esssup
α∈At,t+δ
G t,x;α,βt,t+δ [U (t + δ, X t,x;α,βt+δ )].
After having recalled some basics on two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games, let us
introduce the framework of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games where each of
the both players has his own terminal as well as running cost functionals Φ j and f j , respectively,
j = 1, 2. More precisely, for arbitrarily given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V , we
consider the following BSDEs, j = 1, 2,
j Y t,ζ ;u,vs = Φ j (X t,ζ ;u,vT )+
∫ T
s
f j (r, X
t,ζ ;u,v
r ,
j Y t,ζ ;u,vr , j Z t,ζ ;u,vr , ur , vr )dr
−
∫ T
s
j Z t,ζ ;u,vr dBr , t ≤ s ≤ T,
where X t,ζ ;u,v is introduced by Eq. (3.1) and
Φ j = Φ j (x) : Rn → R,
f j = f j (t, x, y, z, u, v) : [0, T ] × Rn × R× Rd ×U × V → R,
are assumed to satisfy the conditions (H3.3) and (H3.4). In addition, in order to simplify the
arguments, we also suppose that
(H3.5) b, σ,Φ j and f j , j = 1, 2, are bounded.
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The associated stochastic backward semigroups are denoted by j G t,x;u,vt,s , t ≤ s ≤ T, j =
1, 2, and for the associated cost functionals J j (t, x; u, v) = j Y t,x;u,vt , we have
J j (t, x; u, v) = j G t,x;u,vt,T [Φ j (X t,x;u,vT )] = j G t,x;u,vt,t+δ [ j Y t,x;u,vt+δ ]
= j G t,x;u,vt,t+δ [J j (t + δ, X t,x;u,vt+δ , u, v)],
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , 0 ≤ δ ≤ T − t, j = 1, 2.
For what follows, we assume that the Isaacs condition holds in the following sense: for all
(t, x, y, p) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × R × Rn and A ∈ Sn (recall that Sn denotes the set of n × n
symmetric matrices) and for j = 1, 2, we have
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V

1
2
tr(σσ T (t, x, u, v)A)+ ⟨p, b(t, x, u, v)⟩ + f j (t, x, y, pT σ(t, x, u, v), u, v)

= inf
v∈V supu∈U

1
2
tr(σσ T (t, x, u, v)A)+ ⟨p, b(t, x, u, v)⟩
+ f j (t, x, y, pT σ(t, x, u, v), u, v)

. (3.3)
Under Isaacs condition (3.3) we have, similar to [2],
W1(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J1(t, x;α, β) = essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
J1(t, x;α, β),
and
W2(t, x) = essinf
α∈At,T
esssup
β∈Bt,T
J2(t, x;α, β) = esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
J2(t, x;α, β), (3.4)
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn .
Finally, we complete the preparation with the definition of the Nash equilibrium payoff of
stochastic differential games, which is similar to the definition introduced by Buckdahn et al. [3].
Definition 3.13. A couple (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is called a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x) if
for any ε > 0, there exists (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;α, βε)− ε, P-a.s.,
J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε, β)− ε, P-a.s. (3.5)
and
|E[J j (t, x;αε, βε)] − e j | ≤ ε, j = 1, 2.
Remark 3.14. We attract the reader’s attention to the fact that J j (t, x;α, β), j = 1, 2, are
random variables. In our existence result (Theorem 3.20) we will construct cost functionals
J j (t, x;αε, βε), ε > 0, j = 1, 2, which are deterministic.
By virtue of Lemma 3.5 we can easily get the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.15. For any ε > 0 and (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T , (3.5) holds if and only if, for all
(u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x; u, βε(u))− ε, P-a.s.,
J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε(v), v)− ε, P-a.s. (3.6)
We now give the characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum
stochastic differential games.
Theorem 3.16. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn . Under Isaacs condition (3.3), (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is a Nash
equilibrium payoff at point (t, x) if and only if for all ε > 0, there exist (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T
such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
P

j Y t,x;uε,vεs ≥ W j (s, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s )− ε | Ft

≥ 1− ε, P-a.s., (3.7)
and
|E[J j (t, x; uε, vε)] − e j | ≤ ε. (3.8)
Remark 3.17. The above theorem generalizes the results of [3,18] from the case of classical cost
functionals without running costs to nonlinear cost functionals which running costs f j , j = 1, 2,
depend on (y, z). Moreover, in our framework the controls can depend on events occurring before
time t .
We prepare the proof of this theorem by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.18. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn and u ∈ Ut,T be arbitrarily fixed. Then,
(i) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T such that, for all
v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v) = u, on [t, t + δ],
2Y t,x;α(v),vt+δ ≤ W2(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ )+ ε, P-a.s.
(ii) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T such that, for all
v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v) = u, on [t, t + δ],
1Y t,x;α(v),vt+δ ≥ W1(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ )− ε, P-a.s.
Proof. We only give the proof of (i). Indeed, (ii) can be proved by a symmetric argument. We
begin with observing that putting βv
′
(u′) = v′, for all u′ ∈ Ut+δ,T , defines for every v′ ∈ Vt+δ,T
an element βv
′ ∈ Bt+δ,T and allows to regard Vt+δ,T as a subset of Bt+δ,T . Consequently, from
(3.4), for any y ∈ Rn , we have
W2(t + δ, y) = essinf
α∈At+δ,T
esssup
β∈Bt+δ,T
J2(t + δ, y;α, β)
≥ essinf
α∈At+δ,T
esssup
v∈Vt+δ,T
J2(t + δ, y;α(v), v), P-a.s.
Therefore, for ε0 > 0, there exists αy ∈ At+δ,T such that
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W2(t + δ, y) ≥ esssup
v∈Vt+δ,T
J2(t + δ, y;αy(v), v)− ε0, P-a.s. (3.9)
(The existence of αy ∈ At+δ,T can be shown with the techniques used in the proof of Lemma
3.8 in [4].)
Let {Oi }i≥1 ⊂ B(Rn) be a partition of Rn such that ∑i≥1 Oi = Rn, Oi ≠ ∅, and
diam(Oi ) ≤ ε0, i ≥ 1. Let yi ∈ Oi , i ≥ 1. We put, for v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v)s =

us, s ∈ [t, t + δ],−
i≥1
1{X t,x;u,vt+δ ∈Oi }αyi (v|[t+δ,T ])s, s ∈ (t + δ, T ].
(3.10)
The such introduced mapping α : Vt,T → Ut,T is an NAD strategy. Indeed,
(i) The mapping α is nonanticipative.
Proof. For every (Fr )-stopping time τ : Ω → [t, T ], and for v1, v2 ∈ Vt,T with v1 = v2 on
[[t, τ ]], we decompose v1, v2 into v11, v12 ∈ Vt,t+δ and v21, v22 ∈ Vt+δ,T such that v1i = vi on
[t, t + δ], and v2i = vi on [t + δ, T ], i = 1, 2. In order to abbreviate, we will write for this:
v1 = v11 ⊕ v21 and v2 = v12 ⊕ v22 . Then we have v11 = v12 on [[t, τ ∧ (t + δ)]] and v21 = v22
on [[τ ∧ (t + δ), τ ]]. It is obvious that α(v1) = u = α(v2) on [t, t + δ] and, hence, also on
[[t, τ ∧ (t + δ)]]. Since v11 = v12 on [[t, τ ∧ (t + δ)]], we have X
t,x;α(v11),v11
t+δ = X
t,x;α(v12),v12
t+δ on{τ > t + δ},P− a.s. Therefore, because of the nonanticipativity of αyi , i ≥ 1,
α(v1) =
−
i≥1
1
{X t,x;α(v
1
1 ),v
1
1
t+δ ∈Oi }
αyi (v
2
1) =
−
i≥1
1
{X t,x;α(v
1
2 ),v
1
2
t+δ ∈Oi }
αyi (v
2
2) = α(v2)
on [[τ ∧ (t + δ), τ ]]. 
(ii) The mapping α is a nonanticipative strategy with delay.
Proof. For v = v1 ⊕ v2 ∈ Vt,t+δ × Vt+δ,T , we have
α(v) = u ⊕
−
i≥1
1{X t,x;u,v1t+δ ∈Oi }
αyi (v
2).
Let {Sin(v2)}n≥1 be the sequence of the stopping times associated with αyi ∈ At+δ,T in the sense
of Definition 3.4. Then, putting S0 = t, S1 = t + δ,
Sn+1(v) =
−
i≥1
1{X t,x;u,v1t+δ ∈Oi }
Sin(v
2), n ≥ 1.
We have that {Sn(v)}n≥1 satisfies the condition (2) in Definition 3.4. Thus, α is a nonanticipative
strategy with delay. 
From Lemma 3.9, (3.9) and (3.10) it follows that, for v ∈ Vt,T ,
W2(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ) ≥
−
i≥1
1{X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ∈Oi }W2(t + δ, yi )− Cε0
≥
−
i≥1
1{X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ∈Oi } J2(t + δ, yi ;αyi (v|[t+δ,T ]), v)− Cε0
=
−
i≥1
1{X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ∈Oi } J2(t + δ, yi ;α(v), v)− Cε0.
Thus, from Proposition 3.2,
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W2(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ) ≥
−
i≥1
1{X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ∈Oi } J2(t + δ, X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ;α(v), v)− Cε0
= J2(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ;α(v), v)− Cε0.
Here C is a constant which can vary from line to line, but which is independent of v ∈ Vt,T .
Putting ε0 = εC−1 in the latter estimate, we obtain
W2(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ) ≥ J2(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ ;α(v), v)− ε, v ∈ Vt,T .
The proof is complete. 
The proof of Theorem 3.16 necessitates the following lemma.
Lemma 3.19. There exists a positive constant C such that, for all (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
and for all Fr -stopping times S : Ω → [t, T ] with X t,x;u,vS = X t,x;u
′,v′
S ,P-a.s., it holds, for all
real τ ∈ [t, T ],
E

sup
0≤s≤τ
|X t,x;u,v(S+s)∧T − X t,x;u
′,v′
(S+s)∧T |2|Ft

≤ Cτ, P-a.s.
This lemma is the result of a straight forward estimate using the fact that b and σ are bounded.
Let us give now the proof of Theorem 3.16.
Proof of Theorem 3.16 (Sufficiency of (3.7) and (3.8)).
Let ε > 0 be arbitrarily fixed. For ε0 > 0 being specified later we suppose that (uε0 , vε0) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T satisfies (3.7) and (3.8), i.e., for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
P

j Y t,x;uε0 ,vε0s ≥ W j (s, X t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s )− ε0 | Ft

≥ 1− ε0, P-a.s., (3.11)
and
|E[J j (t, x; uε0 , vε0)] − e j | ≤ ε0. (3.12)
Let us fix some partition: t = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tm = T of [t, T ] and τ = supi |ti − ti+1|. We
apply Lemma 3.18 to uε0 and t + δ = t1, . . . , tm , successively. Then, for ε1 > 0 (ε1 depends on
ε and is specified later) there exist NAD strategies αi ∈ At,T , i = 1, . . . ,m, such that, for all
v ∈ Vt,T ,
αi (v) = uε0 , on [t, ti ],
2Y t,x;αi (v),vti ≤ W2(ti , X t,x;αi (v),vti )+ ε1, P-a.s. (3.13)
For all v ∈ Vt,T , we define
Sv = inf

s ≥ t | λ({r ∈ [t, s] : vr ≠ vε0r }) > 0

,
tv = inf

ti ≥ Sv | i = 1, . . . ,m

∧ T,
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on the real line R. Obviously, Sv and tv are stopping
times, and we have Sv ≤ tv ≤ Sv + τ .
Q. Lin / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 122 (2012) 357–385 371
Let
αε(v) =

uε0 , on [[t, tv]],
αi (v), on (ti , T ] × {tv = ti }, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
It is easy to check that αε is an NAD strategy. From (3.13) it follows that
2Y t,x;αε(v),vtv =
m−
i=1
2Y t,x;αε(v),vti 1{tv=ti }
≤
m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;αε(v),v
ti )1{tv=ti } + ε1
= W2(tv, X t,x;αε(v),vtv )+ ε1, P-a.s. (3.14)
In what follows we will show that, for all ε > 0 and v ∈ Vt,T ,
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x; uε0 , vε0)+ ε, αε(vε0) = uε0 . (3.15)
This relation as well as the symmetric one for J1 will lead to the sufficiency of (3.7) and (3.8). For
the proof of (3.15), we note that by (3.14), Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 there exists a positive constant
C such that
J2(t, x, αε(v), v) = 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [2Y t,x,αε(v),vtv ]
≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;αε(v),vtv )+ ε1]
≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;αε(v),vtv )] + Cε1. (3.16)
Thanks to Lemmas 3.9 and 3.19 as well as the definitions of tv and αε we have
E

|W2(tv, X t,x;uε0 ,vε0tv )− W2(tv, X t,x;αε(v),vtv )|2|Ft

≤ CE

|X t,x;uε0 ,vε0tv − X t,x;αε(v),vtv |2|Ft

≤ Cτ, P-a.s.
Thus, from Lemma 2.3 it follows that
|2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv )] − 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;αε(v),vtv )]|
≤ CE[|W2(tv, X t,x;uε0 ,vε0tv )− W2(tv, X t,x;αε(v),vtv )|2|Ft ]
1
2
≤ Cτ 12 ,
and the above inequality and (3.16) yield
J2(t, x, αε(v), v) ≤ |2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv )]
− 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;αε(v),vtv )]|
+ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1
≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2 .
For s ∈ [t, T ], we put
Ωs =

2Y t,x;uε0 ,vε0s ≥ W2(s, X t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s )− ε0

.
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By the inequality a ≤ b + |a − b|, a, b ∈ R, we have
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [W2(tv, X t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2
= 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }

+ Cε1 + Cτ 12
≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }1Ωti

+ Cε1 + Cτ 12
+
2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }

− 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }1Ωti
 . (3.17)
Using Lemma 2.3 again as well as the boundedness of W2, we see that2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }

− 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }1Ωti

≤ CE

m−
i=1
|W2(ti , X t,x;uε0 ,vε0ti )|21{tv=ti }1Ω cti |Ft
 1
2
≤ C
m−
i=1
P(Ω cti |Ft )
1
2 ≤ Cmε
1
2
0 , (3.18)
where we have used (3.11) for the latter estimate. Observing that
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti ≥ W2(ti , X t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti )− ε0, on Ωti ,
we deduce from Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 that
2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }1Ωti

≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
(2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti + ε0)1{tv=ti }1Ωti

≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti 1{tv=ti }1Ωti + ε0

≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti 1{tv=ti }1Ωti

+ Cε0.
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Hence, taking into account 2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv =
∑m
i=1 2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti 1{tv=ti } and that, in analogy to
(3.18)2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti 1{tv=ti }1Ωti

− 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti 1{tv=ti }

≤ Cmε
1
2
0 ,
we see that
2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }1Ωti

≤ 2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ] + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
≤ |2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ] − 2G t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
+ 2G t,x;uε0 ,vε0t,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ] + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
= |2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ] − 2G t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
+ J2(t, x; uε0 , vε0)+ Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 .
In the frame of the proof of (3.15), we also need the following estimate
|2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ] − 2G t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ]| ≤ Cτ
1
2 .
In order to verify this relation we let, for all s ∈ [t, tv],
ys = 2G t,x;αε(v),vs,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ],
and we consider the BSDE solved by y = (ys)
ys = 2Y t,x;uε0 ,vε0tv +
∫ tv
s
f2(r, X
t,x;αε(v),v
r , yr , zr , αε(vr ), vr )dr −
∫ tv
s
zr dBr ,
as well as
2Y t,x;uε0 ,vε0s = 2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv
+
∫ tv
s
f2(r, X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r ,
2Y t,x;uε0 ,vε0r , 2 Z t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r , u
ε0
r , v
ε0
r )dr
−
∫ tv
s
2 Z t,x;uε0 ,vε0r dBr , s ∈ [t, tv].
We notice that αε(v) = uε0 , on [[t, tv]], v = vε0 , on [[t, Sv]]. (Of course, these equalities, in
particular, the latter one, are understood as dsdP-a.e.) Thanks to Lemma 2.3 we have
|2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ] − 2G t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv ]|2
≤ CE
∫ Sv
t
| f2(r, X t,x;αε(v),vr , yr , zr , αε(v)r , vr )
− f2(r, X t,x;uε0 ,vε0r , yr , zr , uε0r , vε0r )|2dr |Ft

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+CE
∫ tv
Sv
| f2(r, X t,x;αε(v),vr , yr , zr , αε(v)r , vr )
− f2(r, X t,x;uε0 ,vε0r , yr , zr , uε0r , vε0r )|2dr |Ft

= CE
∫ tv
Sv
| f2(r, X t,x;αε(v),vr , yr , zr , αε(v)r , vr )
− f2(r, X t,x;uε0 ,vε0r , yr , zr , uε0r , vε0r )|2dr |Ft

≤ CE
∫ tv
Sv
1{vr ≠vε0r }dr |Ft

≤ CE[tv − Sv|Ft ] ≤ Cτ.
Therefore, we have
2G t,x;αε(v),vt,tv

m−
i=1
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti )1{tv=ti }1Ωti

≤ Cτ 12 + J2(t, x; uε0 , vε0)+ Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 ,
and (3.17), (3.18) as well as the above inequality yield
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x; uε0 , vε0)+ Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2 .
We can choose τ > 0, ε0 > 0, and ε1 > 0 such that Cε0 +Cmε
1
2
0 +Cε1 +Cτ
1
2 ≤ ε and ε0 < ε.
Thus,
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x; uε0 , vε0)+ ε, v ∈ Vt,T .
By a symmetric argument we can construct βε ∈ Bt,T such that, for all u ∈ Ut,T ,
J1(t, x; u, βε(u)) ≤ J1(t, x; uε0 , vε0)+ ε, βε(uε0) = vε0 . (3.19)
Finally, by virtue of (3.15), (3.19), (3.12) and Lemma 3.15 we can see that (αε, βε) satisfies
Definition 3.13. Therefore, (e1, e2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff. 
Proof of Theorem 3.16 (Necessity of (3.7) and (3.8)).
We assume that (e1, e2) ∈ R2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x). Then, for all
sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists (αε, βε) ∈ At,T×Bt,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ At,T×Bt,T
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;α, βε)− ε4, P-a.s.,
J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε, β)− ε4, P-a.s.,
(3.20)
and
|E[J j (t, x;αε, βε)] − e j | ≤ ε4, j = 1, 2. (3.21)
Moreover, from Lemma 3.5 we know that there exists a unique couple (uε, vε) such that
αε(v
ε) = uε, βε(uε) = vε.
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Let us argue by contradiction. For this we observe that (3.21) means that (3.8) holds. Assuming
that (3.7) does not hold true, we have, for all ε′ > 0, the existence of some ε ∈ (0, ε′) (for which
we use the notations introduced above) and δ ∈ [0, T − t] such that, for some j ∈ {1, 2}, say for
j = 1,
P

P(1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ < W1(t + δ, X t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )− ε | Ft ) > ε

> 0. (3.22)
Put
A =

1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ < W1(t + δ, X t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )− ε

∈ Ft+δ. (3.23)
By applying Lemma 3.18 to uε and t + δ we see that, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T ,
such that, for all v ∈ Vt,T ,α(v) = uε, on [t, t + δ],
1Y t,x;α(v),vt+δ ≥ W1(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ )− ε2 , P-a.s. (3.24)
By virtue of Lemma 3.5 there exists a unique couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such thatα(v) = u, βε(u) = v.
We observe that this, in particular, means that u = uε on [t, t + δ]. Let us define now a controlu ∈ Ut,T as follows:
u = uε, on ([t, t + δ)× Ω) ∪ ([t + δ, T ] × Ac),
u, on [t + δ, T ] × A.
Since βε ∈ Bt,T is nonanticipative it follows that βε(u) = βε(uε) = vε on [t, t + δ], and for all
s ∈ [t + δ, T ],
βε(u)s = βε(u)s = vs, on A,βε(uε)s = vεs , on Ac.
Then we have
X t,x;u,βε(u) = X t,x;uε,vε , on [t, t + δ],
X t,x;u,βε(u) = X t,x;α(v),v, on [t + δ, T ] × A,
X t,x;uε,vε , on [t + δ, T ] × Ac,
and standard arguments show that also
1Y t,x;u,βε(u)t+δ =

1Y t,x;α(v),vt+δ , on A,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ , on A
c.
Therefore,
J1(t, x;u, βε(u)) = 1Y t,x;u,βε(u)t = 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ [1Y t,x;u,βε(u)t+δ ]
= 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ [1Y t,x;u,βε(u)t+δ 1A + 1Y t,x;u,βε(u)t+δ 1Ac ]
= 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ [1Y t,x;α(v),vt+δ 1A + 1Y t,x;uε,vεt+δ 1Ac ].
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Thanks to Lemma 2.2 and (3.24) we have
J1(t, x;u, βε(u)) = 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ [1Y t,x;α(v),vt+δ 1A + 1Y t,x;uε,vεt+δ 1Ac ]
≥ 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ

W1(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ )− ε2

1A + 1Y t,x;uε,vεt+δ 1Ac

= 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ

W1(t + δ, X t,x;uε,vεt+δ )1A + 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ 1Ac −
ε
2
1A

.
Hence, from (3.23) it follows that
J1(t, x;u, βε(u)) ≥ 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ W1(t + δ, X t,x;uε,vεt+δ )1A + 1Y t,x;uε,vεt+δ 1Ac − ε21A
≥ 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ

(1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ + ε)1A + 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ 1Ac −
ε
2
1A

= 1G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ

1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A

= 1G t,x;uε,vεt,t+δ

1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A

. (3.25)
Let
ys = 1G t,x;uε,vεs,t+δ

1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A

, s ∈ [t, t + δ].
This process is the solution of the following BSDE:
ys = 1Y t,x;uε,vεt+δ +
ε
2
1A +
∫ t+δ
s
f1(r, X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr , zr , u
ε
r , v
ε
r )dr
−
∫ t+δ
s
zr dBr , s ∈ [t, t + δ],
which we compare with
1Y t,x;uε,vεs = 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ +
∫ t+δ
s
f1(r, X
t,x;uε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;uε,vεr , 1 Z t,x;u
ε,vε
r , u
ε
r , v
ε
r )dr
−
∫ t+δ
s
1 Z t,x;uε,vεr dBr , s ∈ [t, t + δ].
Putting
ys = ys − 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
s , zs = zs − 1 Z t,x;u
ε,vε
s , s ∈ [t, t + δ],
we have
ys =
∫ t+δ
s
[ f1(r, X t,x;uε,vεr , yr , zr , uεr , vεr )
− f1(r, X t,x;uε,vεr , 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1 Z t,x;uε,vεr , uεr , vεr )]dr
+ ε
2
1A −
∫ t+δ
s
zr dBr , s ∈ [t, t + δ]. (3.26)
For notational simplification let us assume that the Brownian motion B is one dimensional, and
we introduce, for r ∈ [t, t + δ],
ar = 1{yr ≠0}(yr )−1

f1(r, X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr , zr , u
ε
r , v
ε
r )
− f1(r, X t,x;uε,vεr , 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r , zr , u
ε
r , v
ε
r )

,
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br = 1{zr ≠0}(zr )−1

f1(r, X
t,x;uε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;uε,vεr , zr , uεr , vεr )
− f1(r, X t,x;uε,vεr , 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1 Z t,x;uε,vεr , uεr , vεr )

.
Then, from the Lipschitz property of f1 we see that |ar | ≤ L , |br | ≤ L , r ∈ [t, t + δ], and BSDE
(3.26) takes the following form:
ys =
ε
2
1A +
∫ t+δ
s
[ar yr + br zr ]dr −
∫ t+δ
s
zr dBr , s ∈ [t, t + δ].
By putting
Qs = exp
∫ s
t
ar dr +
∫ s
t
br dBr − 12
∫ s
t
|br |2dr

, s ∈ [t, t + δ],
applying Itoˆ’s formula to ys Qs , and then taking the conditional expectation, we deduce that
yt =
ε
2
E[1A Qt+δ|Ft ].
By the Schwarz inequality we have
P(A|Ft )2 = (E[1A|Ft ])2 ≤ E[1A Qt+δ|Ft ]E[Q−1t+δ|Ft ].
We observe that
E[Q−1t+δ|Ft ] = E

exp

−
∫ t+δ
t
ar dr −
∫ t+δ
t
br dBr + 12
∫ t+δ
t
|br |2dr

| Ft

≤ exp(Lδ + L2δ)E

exp

−
∫ t+δ
t
br dBr − 12
∫ t+δ
t
|br |2dr

| Ft

= exp(Lδ + L2δ).
Let
∆ =

P(1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ < W1(t + δ, X t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )− ε | Ft ) > ε

={P(A|Ft ) > ε}

.
Then,
yt =
ε
2
E[1A Qt+δ|Ft ]
≥ exp(−Lδ − L
2δ)ε
2
(E[1A|Ft ])2 = exp(−Lδ − L
2δ)ε
2
(P(A|Ft ))2
>
ε3
2
C01∆, (3.27)
for C0 = exp(−Lδ − L2δ), where we use (3.22) in the last inequality. Combining (3.27) with
yt = yt − 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t = 1G t,x;u
ε,vε
t,t+δ

1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A

− 1G t,x;uε,vεt,t+δ [1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ ],
we have
1G t,x;u
ε,vε
t,t+δ

1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A

> 1G t,x;u
ε,vε
t,t+δ [1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ ] +
ε3
2
C01∆,
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and (3.25) then yields
J1(t, x;u, βε(u)) > J1(t, x;αε, βε)+ ε32 C01∆.
We can choose ε′ ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small such that ε′32 C0 > ε′
4
. (Recall that ε′ > 0 has
been introduced at the beginning of the proof, assuming that (3.7) does not hold true.) Then this
relation is also satisfied by ε ∈ (0, ε′) : ε32 C0 > ε4. Since P(∆) > 0, the above inequality
contradicts with (3.20) for α(·) =u. The proof is complete. 
We now give the existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Theorem 3.20. Let Isaacs condition (3.3) hold. Then for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn , there exists a
Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x).
Let us admit the following proposition for the moment. We shall give its proof after.
Proposition 3.21. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.16, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T independent of Ft such that, for all t ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ T, j = 1, 2,
P

W j (s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )− ε ≤ j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )]

> 1− ε.
Let us begin with the proof of Theorem 3.20.
Proof. By Theorem 3.16 we only have to prove that, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T which satisfies (3.7) and (3.8) for s ∈ [t, T ], j = 1, 2.
For ε > 0, we consider (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T given by Proposition 3.21, i.e., in
particular, (uε, vε) is independent of Ft , and we put s1 = s, s2 = T in Proposition 3.21.
This yields (3.7). We also observe that the fact that (uε, vε) is independent of Ft implies that
J j (t, x; uε, vε), j = 1, 2, are deterministic and

(J1(t, x; uε, vε), J2(t, x; uε, vε)), ε > 0

is
a bounded sequence. Consequently, we can choose an accumulation point of this sequence, as
ε → 0. Let us denote this point by (e1, e2). Obviously, this combined with (3.7) allows to
conclude from Theorem 3.16 that (e1, e2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x). We also refer to
the fact that since (uε, vε) is independent of Ft , the conditional probability P(·|Ft ) of the event
W j (s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )−ε ≤ j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )]

coincides with its probability. Indeed,
also

W j (s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )− ε ≤ j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )]

is independent of Ft . The proof
is complete. 
Before we present the proof of the above proposition, we give the following lemmas, which
will be needed.
Lemma 3.22. For all ε > 0, and all δ ∈ [0, T−t] and x ∈ Rn , there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T×Vt,T
independent of Ft , such that
W1(t, x)− ε ≤ 1G t,x;uε,vεt,t+δ [W1(t + δ, X t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )], P-a.s.,
and
W2(t, x)− ε ≤ 2G t,x;uε,vεt,t+δ [W2(t + δ, X t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )], P-a.s.
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Proof. Let Ft = (F ts )s∈[t,T ] denote the filtration generated by (Bs − Bt )s∈[t,T ] and augmented
by the P-null sets. By U ts,T (resp., V ts,T ) we denote the set of Ft -adapted processes {ur }r∈[s,T ]
(resp., {vr }r∈[s,T ]) taking their values in U (resp., V ). Moreover, letAts,T (resp., Bts,T ) denote the
set of NAD strategies which map from V ts,T into U ts,T (resp., U ts,T into V ts,T ). With this setting we
replace the framework of SDEs driven by a Brownian motion B = (Bs)s∈[0,T ] by that of SDEs
driven by a Brownian motion (Bs − Bt )s∈[t,T ]. We also translate the above arguments from the
framework of SDEs to the associated BSDEs. Then, proceeding in the same manner as above,
but now in our new framework, we have the Isaacs condition, for j = 1, 2, s ∈ [t, T ],
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V

1
2
tr(σσ T (s, x, u, v)A)+ ⟨p, b(s, x, u, v)⟩ + f j (s, x, y, pT σ(s, x, u, v), u, v)

= inf
v∈V supu∈U

1
2
tr(σσ T (s, x, u, v)A)+ ⟨p, b(s, x, u, v)⟩
+ f j (s, x, y, pT σ(s, x, u, v), u, v)

for the associated value functionalsW1(s, x) = esssup
α∈Ats,T
essinf
β∈Bts,T
J1(s, x;α, β) = essinf
β∈Bts,T
esssup
α∈Ats,T
J1(s, x;α, β),
and W2(s, x) = essinf
α∈Ats,T
esssup
β∈Bts,T
J2(s, x;α, β) = esssup
β∈Bts,T
essinf
α∈Ats,T
J2(s, x;α, β),
(s, x) ∈ [t, T ] × Rn .
For j = 1, 2, from [2] we know that W j restricted to [t, T ] × Rn and W j are inside the class
of continuous functions with at most polynomial growth and the unique viscosity solutions of
the same Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs equation. Consequently, they coincideW j (s, x) = W j (s, x), (s, x) ∈ [t, T ] × Rn, j = 1, 2.
From the dynamic programming principle for W j and by observing that V tt,T ⊂ Btt,T we have
W1(t, x) = W1(t, x) = esssup
α∈Att,T
essinf
β∈Btt,T
1G t,x;α,βt,t+δ [W1(t + δ, X t,x;α,βt+δ )]
≤ esssup
α∈Att,T
essinf
v∈V tt,T
1G t,x;α(v),vt,t+δ [W1(t + δ, X t,x;α(v),vt+δ )].
Consequently, for ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exists αε ∈ Att,T such that, for all v ∈ V tt,T ,
W1(t, x)− ε ≤ 1G t,x;αε(v),vt,t+δ [W1(t + δ, X t,x;αε(v),vt+δ )], P-a.s.
The symmetric argument allows to show that the existence of βε ∈ Btt,T such that, for all
u ∈ U tt,T ,
W2(t, x)− ε ≤ 2G t,x;u,βε(u)t,t+δ [W2(t + δ, X t,x;u,βε(u)t+δ )], P-a.s.
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In the same way as shown in Lemma 3.5, we get the existence of (uε, vε) ∈ U tt,T × V tt,T such
that
αε(v
ε) = uε, βε(uε) = vε.
Therefore, we have
W1(t, x)− ε ≤ 1G t,x;uε,vεt,t+δ [W1(t + δ, X t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )],
and
W2(t, x)− ε ≤ 2G t,x;uε,vεt,t+δ [W2(t + δ, X t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ )].
The proof is complete. 
We also need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.23. Let n ≥ 1 and let us fix some partition t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T of the interval
[t, T ]. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T independent of Ft , such that, for
all i = 0, . . . , n − 1,
W1(ti , X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− ε ≤ 1G t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ,ti+1 [W1(ti+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti+1 )], P-a.s.,
and
W2(ti , X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− ε ≤ 2G t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ,ti+1 [W2(ti+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti+1 )], P-a.s.
Proof. We shall give the proof by induction. By the above lemma, it is obvious for i = 0.
We now assume that (uε, vε) independent of Ft , is constructed on the interval [t, ti ) and we
shall define it on [ti , ti+1). From the above lemma it follows that, for all y ∈ Rn , there exists
(u y, vy) ∈ Uti ,T × Vti ,T independent of Ft , such that,
W j (ti , y)− ε2 ≤
j G ti ,y;u
y ,vy
ti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,y;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )], P-a.s, j = 1, 2. (3.28)
Let us fix arbitrarily j = 1, 2. Moreover, for y, z ∈ Rn and s ∈ [ti , ti+1], we put
y1s = j G ti ,y;u
y ,vy
s,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,y;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )], and y2s = j G ti ,z;u
y ,vy
s,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,z;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )],
and we consider the BSDEs:
y1s = W j (ti+1, X ti ,y;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )+
∫ ti+1
s
f j (r, X
ti ,y;uy ,vy
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr −
∫ ti+1
s
z1r dBr ,
s ∈ [ti , ti+1],
and
y2s = W j (ti+1, X ti ,z;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )+
∫ ti+1
s
f j (r, X
ti ,z;uy ,vy
r , y
2
r , z
2
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr −
∫ ti+1
s
z2r dBr ,
s ∈ [ti , ti+1].
By virtue of Lemmas 2.3, 3.1 and 3.9 we have
| j G ti ,y;uy ,vyti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,y;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )] − j G ti ,z;u
y ,vy
ti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,z;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )]|2
≤ CE[|W j (ti+1, X ti ,y;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )− W j (ti+1, X ti ,z;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )|2|Fti ]
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+CE
[∫ ti+1
ti
 f j (r, X ti ,y;uy ,vyr , y1r , z1r , u yr , vyr )
− f j (r, X ti ,z;uy ,vyr , y1r , z1r , u yr , vyr )
2dr Fti]
≤ CE
[X ti ,y;uy ,vyti+1 − X ti ,z;uy ,vyti+1 2Fti]+ CE [∫ ti+1
ti
X ti ,y;uy ,vyr − X ti ,z;uy ,vyr 2dr Fti]
≤ C |y − z|2.
Therefore, by the above inequality, Lemma 3.9 and (3.28)
W j (ti , z)− ε ≤ W j (ti , y)− ε + C |y − z|
≤ j G ti ,y;uy ,vyti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,y;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )] −
ε
2
+ C |y − z|
≤ j G ti ,z;uy ,vyti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,z;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )] −
ε
2
+ C |y − z|
≤ j G ti ,z;uy ,vyti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,z;u
y ,vy
ti+1 )], P-a.s.,
for C |y − z| ≤ ε2 .
Let {Oi }i≥1 ⊂ B(Rn) be a partition of Rn with diam(Oi ) < ε2C and let yl ∈ Ol . Then, for
z ∈ Ol ,
W j (ti , z)− ε ≤ j G ti ,z;uyl ,vylti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X ti ,z;u
yl ,vyl
ti+1 )], P-a.s., (3.29)
and we define
uε =
−
l≥1
1Ol (X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )u
yl , vε =
−
l≥1
1Ol (X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )v
yl .
Therefore, we have
j G t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti+1 )]
= j G ti ,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti ,ti+1
−
l≥1
W j (ti+1, X
ti ,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti+1 )1Ol (X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )

= j G ti ,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti ,ti+1
−
l≥1
W j (ti+1, X
ti ,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti+1 )1Ol (X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )

=
−
l≥1
j G
ti ,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X
ti ,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti+1 )]1Ol (X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ).
The latter relation follows from the uniqueness of solutions of BSDEs. From (3.29) it follows
that
j G t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti+1 )] ≥
−
l≥1
[W j (ti , X t,x;uyl ,vylti )− ε]1Ol (X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )
=
−
l≥1
W j (ti , X
t,x;uyl ,vyl
ti )1Ol (X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− ε
= W j (ti , X t,x;uε,vεti )− ε.
The proof is complete. 
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Finally, we give the proof of Proposition 3.21.
Proof. Let t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T be a partition of [t, T ], and τ = supi (ti+1 − ti ). From
Lemma 3.9 it follows that, for all j = 1, 2, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, s ∈ [tk, tk+1) and (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
E[|W j (tk, X t,x;u,vtk )− W j (s, X t,x;u,vs )|2]
≤ 2E[|W j (tk, X t,x;u,vtk )− W j (s, X t,x;u,vtk )|2]
+ 2E[|W j (s, X t,x;u,vtk )− W j (s, X t,x;u,vs )|2]
≤ C |s − tk |(1+ E[|X t,x;u,vtk |2])+ CE[|X t,x;u,vtk − X t,x;u,vs |2]
≤ Cτ. (3.30)
Here and after C is a constant which may be different from line to line.
By virtue of Lemma 3.23 we let (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T be defined as in Lemma 3.23 for
ε = ε0, where ε0 > 0 will be specified later. Then, we have for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
W j (ti , X
t,x;uε,vε
ti )− ε0 ≤ j G t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti+1 )], P-a.s.
For t ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ T , we suppose, without loss of generality, that ti−1 ≤ s1 ≤ ti and
tk ≤ s2 ≤ tk+1, for some 1 ≤ i < k ≤ n − 1. Therefore, by Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 we have
j G t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] = j G t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ,tk [ j G t,x;u
ε,vε
tk ,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )]]
≥ j G t,x;uε,vεti ,tk [W j (tk, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk )− ε0]
≥ j G t,x;uε,vεti ,tk [W j (tk, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk )] − Cε0
≥ · · · ≥ j G t,x;uε,vεti ,ti+1 [W j (ti+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti+1 )] − C(k − i)ε0
≥ W j (ti , X t,x;uε,vεti )− C(k − i + 1)ε0
and the above inequality yields
j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] = j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [ j G t,x;u
ε,vε
ti ,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )]]
≥ j G t,x;uε,vεs1,ti [W j (ti , X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )− C(k − i + 1)ε0]
≥ j G t,x;uε,vεs1,ti [W j (ti , X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )] − C(k − i + 1)ε0
≥ j G t,x;uε,vεs1,ti [W j (ti , X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )] −
ε
2
,
where we put ε0 = ε2Cn . Let us put
I1 = j G t,x;uε,vεs1,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] − j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti [W j (ti , X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )] +
ε
2
≥ 0,
I2 = j G t,x;uε,vεs1,s2 [W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )] − W j (s1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s1 )+
ε
2
. (3.31)
We assert that
E[|I1 − I2|2] ≤ Cτ.
Indeed, setting
ys = j G t,x;uε,vεs,ti [W j (ti , X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )], s ∈ [s1, ti ],
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we have the associated BSDEs:
ys = W j (ti , X t,x;uε,vεti )+
∫ ti
s
f j (r, X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr , zr , u
ε
r , v
ε
r )dr −
∫ ti
s
zr dBr ,
s ∈ [s1, ti ].
On the other hand, putting
y′s = W j (s1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s1 ), s ∈ [s1, ti ],
we have by Lemma 2.3
| j G t,x;uε,vεs1,ti [W j (ti , X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )] − W j (s1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s1 )|2
≤ CE[|W j (ti , X t,x;uε,vεti )− W j (s1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s1 )|2|Fs1 ]
+CE
[∫ ti
s1
| f j (r, X t,x;uε,vεr , yr , zr , uεr , vεr )|2dr |Fs1
]
.
Therefore, from the boundedness of f j and the independence of Ft of (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
E[| j G t,x;uε,vεs1,ti [W j (ti , X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )] − W j (s1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s1 )|2|Ft ]
≤ CE[|W j (ti , X t,x;uε,vεti )− W j (s1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s1 )|2|Ft ] + C(ti − s1)
= CE[|W j (ti , X t,x;uε,vεti )− W j (s1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s1 )|2] + C(ti − s1).
From (3.30) it follows that
E[| j G t,x;uε,vεs1,ti [W j (ti , X t,x;u
ε,vε
ti )] − W j (s1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s1 )|2] ≤ Cτ. (3.32)
By a similar argument we have
E[| j G t,x;uε,vεs2,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] − W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )|2] ≤ Cτ. (3.33)
For s ∈ [s1, s2] we let
y1s = j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] = j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s,s2 [ j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s2,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )]],
and
y2s = j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s,s2 [W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )],
and we consider the associated BSDEs:
y1s = j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s2,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] +
∫ s2
s
f j (r, X
t,x;uε,vε
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
ε
r , v
ε
r )dr
−
∫ s2
s
z1r dBr , s ∈ [s1, s2],
and
y2s = W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )+
∫ s2
s
f j (r, X
t,x;uε,vε
r , y
2
r , z
2
r , u
ε
r , v
ε
r )dr −
∫ s2
s
z2r dBr ,
s ∈ [s1, s2].
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By virtue of Lemma 2.3 we have
| j G t,x;uε,vεs1,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] − j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )]|2
≤ CE[| j G t,x;uε,vεs2,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] − W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )|2|Fs1 ].
Consequently, from (3.33) it follows that
E[| j G t,x;uε,vεs1,tk+1 [W j (tk+1, X t,x;u
ε,vε
tk+1 )] − j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )]|2] ≤ Cτ.
By the above inequality and (3.32) we get
E[|I1 − I2|2] ≤ Cτ.
Consequently,
P

I2 ≤ −ε2

≤ P

|I1 − I2| ≥ ε2

≤ 4E[|I1 − I2|
2]
ε2
≤ 4Cτ
ε2
≤ ε,
where we choose τ ≤ ε34C , and from (3.31) it follows that
P

W j (s1, X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 )− ε ≤ j G t,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [W j (s2, X t,x;u
ε,vε
s2 )]

≥ 1− ε.
The proof is complete. 
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